INTRODUCTION
For the last decade since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Dept. of Energy's (DOE) mission has shifted focus to include environmental restoration of the many sites around the country contaminated by the waste products of over 50 years of weapons production. This is commonly referred to as the "environmental legacy of the Cold War." Many of the cleanup problems are complex, challenging, and expensive. Not all the solutions are known.
On the basis of the use of existing technologies and cleanup approaches, the cost estimate for cleaning up the DOE's 130 sites is on the order of $250 billion over the next 75 years [1] .
Since 1989 the DOE has promoted a Technology Development program designed to encourage innovative approaches to cleanup, enhance technical performance, and reduce costs. However, the DOE's Environmental Management Technology Development Program (EM-50) has been challenged to justify expenditures of over $2.5 billion dollars in development money over the last eight years, when only $300 million dollars has been estimated in savings to date. Expenditures have been easier to measure than cost savings because there has not been a consistent mechanism thus far to track technology deployments over time.
Partially in response to this challenge to show accountability to U.S. taxpayers, the current DOE administration has implemented a new approach to accelerate deployment of some of the promising innovative technologies that have reached an advanced stage of maturity in the development process. This plan is called Accelerated Site Technology Deployment (ASTD), formerly the Technology Deployment Initiative (TDI). In addition, the administration is attempting to integrate cleanups at the major DOE sites within the relatively short time period of 10 years. The framework for effecting this approach to cleanup at DOE sites is called Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure [1] , formerly known as the 2006 Plan.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER
The purpose of this paper is to provide a response to the general question as to why there has been so little actual application of new environmental technologies to on-the-ground cleanup. There are two sides to the issue that may at first seem unrelated, but taken together provide both a tactical and theoretical response to the question.
EM-50 has provided a tactical response to the challenge of showing that expenditures in technology development are justified by implementation of its ASTD program. ASTD provides a fiscal incentive for the major DOE facilities to effect remedial actions using new technologies. The purpose of the ASTD is to demonstrate to stakeholders, including U.S. Congress and concerned citizens, that environmental costs can be reduced and site cleanup accelerated by substituting new technologies for established baseline methods.
The theoretical side looks at how historically, the substitution of new technologies for old in any given industry follows well-documented principles of diffusion; therefore, the aggregate adoption of new environmental technologies is predictive. It is not within the scope of this paper to accurately quantify the equations that result in the mathematical description of the S-shaped diffusion curve, but the overall concept of the innovation-development process is an important clue in understanding why new EM-50 technologies are not already in more widespread use.
THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
When several technologies vie to address the same problem, why do few succeed and many fail? The innovation-development process consists of all the decisions and activities, and their impacts, that occur from recognition of a need or a problem, through research and development and commercialization of an innovation, through diffusion and adoption of the innovation by users, to its consequences [2] . Experience has shown that adoption by users is not based on cost effectiveness or performance alone. It is a complex process that involves a great deal of interpersonal communication exchanges over an extended period of time.
The DOE defines technology transfer as the process by which technology, knowledge, or information developed in one organization, in one area, or for one purpose is applied or used in another organization, or area, or for another purpose. This end user is often an engineer hands-on type whose motivation for using a new technology may be entirely different than that of a DOE-EM Washington bureaucrat. The mere term, "demonstration," may be negatively perceived by the site manager because it implies a test of something (usually highly technical) that may have worked on a laboratory bench top, but is most likely not ready for prime time in the field. "Pilot tests" are often regarded with skepticism because scaleup of physical/chemical processes is typically nonlinear, making it difficult to predict how a new technology will transition from the development to the deployment stage. In short there is a wide gap in organizational culture that exists between the person responsible at field level for cleanup and the decision maker at DOE headquarters trying to prevent budget cuts.
Other Barriers to Technology Transfer and Commercialization
Major obstacles to technology transfer have been well documented in the literature [4, 5] . The study "Barriers to Environmental Technology Commercialization," [Berkey, et al., 1995] identifies the following obstacles to successful adoption of innovative cleanup technologies:
• cumbersome DOE contracting/procurement requirements;
• potential liability exposure for developers;
• inadequate articulation of DOE technology needs or market size;
• lack of adequate DOE site characterizations;
• insufficient technology performance or cost data;
• lack of performance-based standards that can encourage new technologies;
• inconsistent, multi-level permitting process;
• "not-invented-here" mindset within DOE;
• pronounced lack of entrepreneurial management;
• lack of adequate development funding;
• market uncertainty due to changing requirements and priorities;
• lack of consistent regulatory enforcement;
• limited technology applications for private sector;
• lengthy and uncertain commercialization pathway, and 
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• lack of strong linkage between technology developments efforts and technology deployment efforts.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address each of these barriers in detail. Although all are valid and merit discussion, it is the last item, the weak link between development and deployment, that the ASTD seeks to strengthen.
ASTD PROVIDES INCENTIVE TO TECH TRANSFER
Typically, between the stages of advanced development and predeployment is where critical financial support for further technology development breaks down. The gap in funding occurs when the federal funding program considers a technology "too applied" for additional funding and industry considers the technology "too embryonic" (pre-venture capital stage) to adopt. This funding gap in the technology development cycle has been described as the "Valley of Death" [6] (see Figure 1 ). ASTD is an attempt to bridge the funding gap by providing to the sites a fiscal incentive to deploy new technologies for cleanup. This is accomplished through a fund set up by EM-50 to share in the initial costs of deployment with the participating sites. Distribution of ASTD funds are contingent upon submission of a successful proposal. Only technologies that have been previously demonstrated at the field scale are eligible to be included in proposals.
SEED CAPITAL 'V ALLEY OF DEAT H'
LA-UR-99-1378 March 1999
5
If selected, ASTD funding makes possible the deployment of the technology at the initial site. Subsequent cost savings accrued by using the new technology are allowed to be kept in that site's environmental program;
hence, an economic incentive exists for both program offices and field sites. For example, if Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) had budgeted $15 million to remediate actinide-contaminated soils using the conventional method of excavation and disposal, but instead was awarded ASTD money to deploy a new soil sorting/soil washing system that would accomplish the same objective for $5 million, then the resulting $10 million in savings would be available for LANL to use in other areas, further accelerating cleanup at the site [7] .
Each ASTD proposal is judged on the basis of technical merit, business/management approach, stakeholder/regulatory approval, and life-cycle cost. In addition , each proposed technology must demonstrate that it:
• supports the ASTD mission to reduce costs, accelerate site cleanup, and enhance achievement of 2006 Plan goals;
• provides for multiple applications of the technology;
• demonstrates cost savings and high return on investment over the baseline method;
• accelerates a referenced baseline schedule;
• is deployable (i.e., technically feasible at field scale);
• is supported by joint funding provided by the proposing organization.
Finally, the proposal must include a letter of commitment from the initial site where the technology is to be deployed, as well as letters of interest from other DOE sites where the technology is applicable.
The EM program expects to receive a total of about 150 proposals, primarily from the top 10 major laboratories (including LANL and Sandia). Of these, maybe 18 or 20 will make the final cut. ASTD funding levels 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: A Look at Other Industries
Some of the major barriers to technology transfer and commercialization have been identified, and the ASTD program has been discussed as a potential means to facilitate deployment of new, cost-effective technologies in the field. How do technology deployment opportunities within DOE compare to those in the private sector?
Historical records illustrate that considerable time and effort is expended to achieve tech transfer in other industries compared to the DOE. There is an underlying assumption in government that because DOE is both the supplier and the consumer of innovative technology, the innovation-development process should happen instantaneously.
However, data collected from other industries support the fact that the technology transfer process consists of timeconsuming, predictable, and quantifiable steps in a well-documented diffusion cycle.
The S-shaped Diffusion Curve
One of the most basic tenets about technological adoption and market penetration is that it involves a welldocumented diffusion process. Initially, an older technology has the advantage because it is well understood, its reliability is usually high, users have confidence in its applications, and both equipment and knowledgeable operators are readily available. Any new technology is unfamiliar, its reliability is questionable, and its supporting equipment and trained staff are scarce. As the initial problems are overcome, communication spreads knowledge awareness about the technology, the rate of adoption increases, and substitution of the new technology for old tends to proceed exponentially during early years. The rate of substitution only slows after very rapid growth, when the older technology presents fewer and fewer opportunities for replacement.
This process produces the well known concept of the S-shaped curve used in forecasting diffusion of innovative technologies over time. The Pearl curve and the Gompertz curve represent the two most common variants on a quantitative model of this process [8] . The parameters of these curves and therefore the future rate of technological substitution have been shown to be estimable from the growth rates in only the first few percentage points of market penetration by a new technology. For example, Marchetti (1983) [9] found in a study of automobile adoption in nine countries that the rate of adoption had been fixed by the time the automobile reached a market penetration of only 1%. The Pearl curve is the more appropriate model in our case because, unlike the Gompertz curve, past adoption practices influence future adoption rates.
The Substitution Model of Technological Change developed by John Fisher and Robert Pry (1971) [10] shows that the aggregate adoption of new environmental technologies is likely to follow the same S-shaped Pearl curve applicable to the substitution of new technologies in many other industries. This model is based on three assumptions [11] : 7 1 . Many technological advances can be considered as competitive substitutions of one method of satisfying a need for another.
2. If substitution has progressed as far as a few per cent of the total consumption, it will proceed to completion.
3. The fractional rate of fractional substitution of new for old is proportional to the remaining amount of the old left to be substituted.
The fraction of market penetration, f, by a new technology is given by:
where tanh is the hyperbolic tangent, a is a shape coefficient representing half the annual fractional growth during the early years, t is time, and t 0 is the time it takes to reach 50% market penetration. For many cases in industry, substitution data has been plotted over time to show trends in substitution of one product or technology for another.
A convenient, straight-line way of illustrating such data is to plot f/1-f against time on semi-log scale. Figure 2 shows four examples of this type of substitution data. Note that the time between 10% and 50% market penetration, 
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Using the same parameters in equation (1) This can enable us to show that the current $300+ million overall savings accrued from the deployment of specific new environmental technologies is perfectly reasonable to expect given our position on the Pearl curve as shown in If we take our data points as cumulative savings to date of $300 million approximately 8 years after the start of technological development and initial applications, spread the $300 million over time as if it has grown exponentially --assuming that the new technologies typically save 30% of costs over the old --then we have now achieved an aggregate market penetration of about 10%. Ultimately, we will be saving 30% of the EM budget 
The Relationship between R&D and Technical Productivity
There are those who criticize the ASTD as a last-ditch effort for DOE's EM-50 to justify its existence. The implication is that the DOE should spend less on R&D and more on cleanup. But again, data from other industries may be used to show that perhaps more attention should be paid to R&D. Industries that are in their infancy, those that emphasize growth through innovation, those trying to exploit new market opportunities or specialize in streams of new, high-tech products all make use of relatively high R&D expenditures. The pharmaceutical, computer, chemical, and semiconductor industries spend heavily on R&D, as shown in Figure 4 . These are the same industries that enjoy rapid growth in revenues and profits. The converse is found in the commodity producers, metals, food, clothing, housing, and appliance industries. These are mature industries with fewer opportunities for technological innovation, and correspondingly slower growth [12] . One can argue that the DOE EM program is still in its infancy, has highly challenging unsolved technical problems, and numerous opportunities to discover new ways of accomplishing its goals. Thus, EM should be following the high percentage R&D spending policy of its private sector counterparts. Figure 4 shows that EM's 5.5% R&D score is in the middle of the pack, far below the innovative and fast-growing industries of the private sector. The most innovative industries spend more than 10% of their revenues on R&D.
Since one of EM-50's primary roles is to provide the technology development resources and management to assure that technical productivity increases are achieved, EM needs to take seriously its commitment to R&D in order to meet its projected technical and fiscal goals. Current EM productivity increase assumptions [1] are very optimistic and require a strong technology development effort to make them happen.
CONCLUSIONS
I offer the following conclusions from this analysis:
(1) The technology transfer process as applied to the DOE's EM program is not without problems. Many barriers to technology transfer have been identified, and the DOE has not implemented mechanisms to track successful technology deployments.
(2) Nevertheless, the roughly quantified adoption rate to date supports the idea that the majority of cost savings are still to come as the innovative technologies' market penetration proceeds in accordance with well-known diffusion patterns. 
